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The past decade has witnessed a significant acceleration
in Turkey's rate of economic expansion. During the plan
periods (1963-67, 1968-72), the annual average real rate of
growth in the GNP has been 6.41. The decade of 1951-1962
had experienced a real average annual rate of 4%. The an-
nual rate of inflation during the 1950' s approached 10%,
whilst between 1961 and 1970 it has been 4.4%, a figure
comparable to the average for all the O.E.C.D. countries.
The long-term target of self -sustained economic growth,
i.e., independent of foreign loans, was a prominant aim of
the plans.
Despite the evident success of economic planning some
basic problems have been a constant source of anxiety to
the economic authorities throughout the plan periods: the
balance of payments situation, rapid growth of population,
the high levels of open and disguised unemployment, insuf-
ficiency of domestic savings and financial institutions,
excessive dependence of agriculture on weather conditions.
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The primary aim of this study is to describe the eco-
nomic developments and analyze the determinants of the
growth of the Turkish economy, especially over the First
and Second Plan periods (1963-1967, 1968-1972) - the targets
and realizations of the plans, rate of growth and structural
changes, investment, sources and allocations, public fi-
nance, production trends, and foreign economic relations.
The background prior to these plan periods is provided
in Chapter II, which outlines the economic development in
the Turkish economy during the decade immediately preceding
the planning era.
In Chapters III and IV the general objectives of the
development plans and basic economic policy in the Turkish
economy (mixed economy) are briefly discussed.
Despite the evident success of economic planning some
basic problems have been a constant source of anxiety to
the economic planners and authorities throughout plan
periods. These basic problems restricting the development
of the Turkish economy, and conclusions to this study are
sketched in Chapters V and VI, respectively.
An econometric analysis of the patterns of economic de-
velopment in the structure of production (industry and pri-
mary production) among countries in market economies, is
presented in the Appendix, to predict a pattern of economic
development of the Turkish economy and to find the position
of the Turkish economy in the world economy.
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Three distinct development patterns have been identified
from cross-country analyses: large countries including
Turkey, small industry-oriented countries, and small pri-
mary-oriented countries. Time-series analyses of growth
paths (Kuznets' studies) supported the hypothesis that time-
series and cross-country patterns have considerable similari-
ties. From this major finding it was possible to derive or
predict a development pattern for Turkey as its income level
rises that being the large country pattern.
For the proceeding plans, the strategy of "decreasing
the agricultural sector's share in GNP, and increasing the
industrial sector's share and also increasing both sector's
productivity" has been adopted as a sound and valid policy,
by the evaluations of the Five-Year Plans.
If allowances are made for the unfavorable weather con-
ditions and over-optimistic foreign aid receipts, from the
macro-economic point of view, the preparation and implemen-
tation of the Plans are considered successful.

II. TURKEY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION BEFORE THE PLAN PERIODS
Although called the First-Five-Year Development Plan,
the Plan covering the period 1963-1967 was not the first
attempt at planned economic development in the history of
the Turkish Republic. Two five-year plans had been drawn
up in the 1930 's, the second being abandoned at the begin-
ning of the Second World War, and another was started in
1946.
The Democratic Party which had strongly attacked etatism
[Ref. 2] in the election campaign, was returned to power in
1950. Planning was rejected and a policy of de-nationali-
zation proposed. In fact, although no planning took place
during the decade of the 1950' s, neither did any de-nation-
alization. Private enterprise was welcomed and more empha-
sis laid on agricultural development [Ref. 3l. .
The 1950' s were not years of successful economic de-
velopment. The average annual real rate of economic growth,
as measured by the rise in the real level of GNP , was 4.05
between 1951 and 1961 and 3.4% between 1956 and 1961. During
the latter period per capita income actually declined [Ref.
4] . Despite this slow rate of growth the level of aggregate
demand continuously exceeded supply resulting in severe in-
flation. Part of this consisted of comparatively heavy in-
vestment outlays. It is therefore surprising that growth in
the real level of GNP was not greater. The answer appears
to lie in the fact that the investment which was undertaken
10

was extremely unproductive, the high level of public invest-
ment consisting of much infra-structure investment and pro-
jects chosen for political rather than economic merit [Ref.
5] . The investment in infra-structure was not all wasteful
but did, quite predictably, tend to be an investment with a
low output-capital ratio.
The high level of public investment was achieved by re-
liance on inflationary forms of finance. The heavy deficit
spending by the Government during this period was undoubted-
ly the main cause of the inflation which occurred. The money
supply increased from l,145m.TL. in 1950 to 5,574m.TL. in
1960. The cost of living index in Istanbul rose from 38 in
1950 to 93 in 1960 and was slightly more in Ankara. The
general wholesale price index rose from 35 in 1950 to 92 in
1960, and the implicit GNP deflator indicates an average
annual rate of inflation of almost 101 [Ref. 4],
The worst effect of this high rate of inflation was
clearly on the balance of payments. Devaluation was strongly
resisted by the Government as a solution to the serious im-
balance which appeared in the early 1950' s. By 1956, how-
ever, the situation had reached a point where action had
to be taken. The course pursued by the Government was to
enact a law empowering it to fix any prices, commissions,-
fees, etc. A limit was also fixed for the expansion of
credit. As an immediate solution to the balance of pay-
ments problem, tariffs on imports were raised and subsidies
provided for exports. A tourist rate was introduced which
lowered the exchange rate for certain categories of visitors
11

from 2.8TL. to the dollar to 5.25TL. to the dollar. Black
market rates, however, were reported to lie in the region
of 10-12TL. to the dollar [Ref. 3].
The measures taken to stem the tide of rising prices
were quite inadequate, and after a brief respite prices
again began to spiral upwards reaching a rate of inflation
of 201 in 1958. It is this year which is usually taken by
commentators and historians to mark the end of an era [Ref.
7], A stock-taking of the 1950' s is made up this year.
Radical changes took place then making events in the last
two years of the decade somehow incomparable. In 1958,
however, there was not a turning point in the economic his-
tory of the Turkish Republic. It is taken as a date from
which to assess the developments of the 1950' s because in
1958 the Government devalued the lira from 2.8TL. to 9.0TL.
to the dollar and, at the same time, agreed with the O.E.E.C
and the I.M.F. to secure the new rate by running a balanced
budget. This the Government ultimately failed to do, and
inflation and more balance of payments crises followed in
the subsequent two years [Ref. 4]
.
The continued inflation, further losses of reserves and
increased political agitation culminated in the military
coup of May 1960.
Political and economic stability was finally restored
in 1962 after the disruptions of the revolution. Before
this, however, an indication of a change in the general ap-
proach to economic policy came with the establishment of
the State Planning Organization in October 1960, less than
12

five months after the military take-over. The planners began
work on preparing both a five-year plan to begin in 1963 and
a one-year program for the transition year, 1962.
Although 1958 has been regarded as a false dawn in this
analysis of the developments in the Turkish economy, 1962
can be considered a watershed in modern Turkish history.
The decade 1951-1961 had experienced a real average annual
rate of growth in GNP of 4.01, but this fell, in the second
half of the decade, to 3.4%. In contrast, the seven year
period from 1962 to 1963 produced an average growth rate of
6.4%, and the per capita growth rate shifted from a negative
to a positive rate averaging 3.9% [Ref. 4]. Since the revo-
lution, considerable interest has been taken in the prepa-
rations of the State Planning Organization for the five-year
development plans [Refs. 6, 7 and 8] and annual programs
which proceeded the five-year plans.
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III. GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS
The Five-Year development plans, based on the princi-
ples of justice and full employment, are aimed at raising
the standard of living of the Turkish people to a level
compatible with human dignity in a free and civilized en-
vironment, within a democratic and mixed economic system.
The objectives of the Five-Year Plans were, primarily,
to achieve a rapid and sustained increase in per capita
income, while secondarily, to achieve a balanced develop-
ment between various regions and income brackets, to secure
possibilities of employment for a greater number of people,
to share the benefits and burdens of the development with
equity and within the principles of social justice, and to
attain an efficient and stable improvement in the social
and economic structure.
The basic developmental objective of the plans was to
increase the GNP by 1% annually, during the period 1963-72.
The plans, however, did not only aim at accelerating the
rate of growth, but also aimed at achieving a production
capacity capable of sustaining the economic and social
structure of Turkey and a fast rate of growth beyond the
year 1972. For this purpose the rapid elimination of
structural difficulties facing the Turkish economy and the
most effective utilization of available resources was con-
sidered imperative. During the plan periods, the realiza-
tion of a sustained high rate of growth in the Turkish
14

economy" depended upon the degree of decisiveness and suc-
cess in attaining the selected targets [Ref . 7]
.
The plans aimed at achieving a 7% rate of growth per
annum in the economy, and established as a target the
realization of radical changes to ensure and maintain that
growth rate. The modernization of economic activities, as
a whole, depended upon the use of modern technology and
know-how in agriculture, instead of traditional methods,
and upon achievement of a rapid increase in the relative
share of the industrial sector in GNP. For this purpose the
output of the industrial sector, which would become the
leading sector of the economy during the Second Plan period,
would mark an increase of 12% yearly, and its relative
share in GNP would increase from 16.3% in 1967 to 20.5% in
1972. To achieve this increase it was considered impera-
tive to expand the general employment opportunities; to
transfer surplus manpower from the agricultural sector into
non-agricultural activities; to utilize trained manpower
more effectively; to gradually reduce the dependence of
the Turkish economy on foreign resources; to alleviate the
problems in the balance of payments; and above all, to ac-
celerate the rate of industrial activity in order to attain
rapid development, and to promote urbanization parallel with
the efforts towards industrialization.
While the plans aimed at changing the general structure
of the economy from an agricultural character to one where
the industrial sector predominated, they also aimed at re-
ducing the dependence of agricultural output on weather
15

conditions. A decline in the share of agriculture in na-
tional income and a reduction in the dependence of agri-
cultural output on weather conditions, would ensure control
over the growth rate and permit the establishment of a
standard of living consistent with the choices and aspira-
tions of the nation.
During the plan periods, efforts toward reducing the
dependence of agricultural output on weather conditions
were considered imperative in order to avoid fluctuations
in the standard of living of the agricultural population,
by ensuring a more stable rate of growth. It would also
enable the preparation of more dependable plans based on
more reliable estimates.
Raising the standard of living and the welfare of the
community has been set as a target in the plans. However,
a contradiction existed, in general, between the target of
accelerating the rate of growth of the economy as fast as
possible, and the target of raising the physical welfare
of the present generations as measured in terms of con-
sumption levels. In other words, the future economic
strength and welfare of the Turkish community depend upon
the extent of the restriction the present generations can
impose upon their consumption, and the size of the increase
in total savings and investment they can achieve. The rate
of growth envisioned in the plans defined the choice made
by the Turkish Nation between these two targets. In order
to achieve, in the long run, a rapid improvement in the
16

standard of living, the plan aimed at increasing domestic
savings by 77.6% during the period 1967-62 and stipulated
a rise of only 28.0% in five years, (or 5.1% per annum), in
private consumption expenditure. During the same period,
however, the population was estimated to have increased by .
approximately 2.6% per annum. Consequently, the consump-
tion or the standard of living of the present generations
would increase by only 2.5%, against an increase of 4.4%
in per capita GNP. Per capita GNP would thus rise from TL
1,755 to TL 1,980. Nevertheless, as a result of the poli-
cies followed to ensure a more equitable distribution of
rising income and to achieve a balanced development be-
tween the various regions, the standard of living of the
low income groups of the community is projected to rise at
an above average rate.
When the great differences between the rate of growth
in savings and in consumption is taken into consideration,
the main objective of the plans has to be defined more
clearly: "The plans aimed at strengthening the structure
of the Turkish economy to a level capable of sustaining a
high rate of growth through efforts consistent with the
principles of social justice and of equality in opportunity
and, consequently, they aimed at raising the standard of
living of future generations rather than raising the phy-
sical welfare or consumption level of the community during
the plan periods." [Ref. 7].
The long-term objective of the Turkish Nation is to
provide the economy with a structure permitting it to
17

sustain the stipulated growth rate through its own resources
without recourse to foreign aid. Although foreign resources,
in the nature of developmental credits, has to be transferred
from abroad to Turkey as a consequence of the efforts to
realize the stated objective, the plans aimed at keeping
such transfers of foreign resources at the lowest level
possible and called for a fall in the relative share of these
resources in GNP, from 2.0% in 1967 to 1.7% in 1972. The
period 1968-72, therefore, constituted the most critical
years for the Nation in its efforts to attain economic self-
sufficiency [Ref . 8] .
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IV. BASIC POLICY OF THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLANS: MIXED
ECONOMIC POLICY
A. PRINCIPLES
The basic objective of the mixed economy system is to
accelerate development by mobilizing all the resources and
potential of the country through the framework of a better
distribution of resources among economic and social activities.
The mixed economy system was employed as a tool capable
of ensuring an equitable and balanced development in the ef-
forts towards improving the welfare of the nation.
Although the plans were imperative for the public sector,
for the private sector they served as a guide and support and
they helped individuals explore and develop their enterprising
potential.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIXED ECONOMIC SYSTEM
A study of the historical evolution of the Turksih economy
reveals the existence of various periods of different charac-
teristics. During the period 1923-1Q32, an economic policy
dependent on the private sector was adopted. During this
period measures were taken to encourage the growth of pri-
vate enterprise through the establishment of the Is Bank
and the Industry and Mining Bank and by enacting the 1928
Law on the "Encouragement of Industry." However, in 1932
the State began to participate in economic activities di-
rectly. As a result of this practice the system called
"mixed economy" came into existence..
19

Although widely implemented in almost all of the con-
temporary societies having chosen a free and democratic way
of life, the mixed economy system represents a different
character in Turkey both as to the conditions which caused
its creation and as to its development.
Turkey was one of the first countries in the world to
widely implement the mixed economy system. This system,
however, was not created in Turkey under doctrinal consid-
erations. It cane about as a result of the need for rapid
development and of the necessity to reach quickly the level
of contemporary civilization by making use of all available
resources
.
At the beginning of the 1930' s, insufficient savings
needed for development and the lack of enterpreneurs cap-
able of directing these limited savings into productive in-
vestments within the Turkish society forced the State to
participate in economic life not only in the capacity of
regulating economic activities but in the capacity of making
direct investments in the basic production oriented indus-
tries. Basic industries in the fields of mining and metal-
lurgy and the first installations of considerable size built
to meet the basic feed and clothing requirements of the people
were established by the State. However, conditions providing
the possibility to transfer these installations to private
enterprise in the course of time were introduced under a
special law which was put into force in 1938.
Drawbacks observed in the operation of the market mech-
anism, in addition to the insufficient savings and entepreneurs
20

have been influential in the extensive implementation of
the mixed economy system. Indeed, the prices established
in an improperly operating market could not accurately re-
flect the actual scarcities or abundances in the economy.
Employment of market prices alone as an indicator in reach-
ing a decision on investments and production prevents the
effective distribution of resources and causes wasteful ex-
penditures in the economy. In other words, the failure to
distinguish between the social and individual nature of
profits prevents the effective distribution of resources
for development of the economy.
The inability of private enterprise alone to attain the
rapid development taken as a target by the Turkish nation
created the necessity for the public sector to make direct
investments in production activities. However, the lack
of responsibility associated with ownership, the failure to
establish a clear relation between the risks and the rewards
of this undertaking and the deficiencies in the direct in-
terference of the State in economic life have prevented,
in the final analysis, the effective utilization of re-
sources. The absence of dynamism peculiar to private enter-
prise in the economic activities of the State cause bottlenecks
in communication and an increase in red-tape which reduces
administrative efficiency.
The mixed economy system which began to be implemented
in the 1930' s marked a development in the course of time and
formed a characteristic feature of the Turkish nation and
economy. During the years following the Second World War,
21

the private sector marked a substantial development. As a
result of this development, the relative share of the pri-
vate sector industrial development activities reached the
level of 61 percent during the period 1963-1971 [Ref. 7].
C. THE RULES OF MIXED ECONOMY
The functioning of the public and private sectors side
by side in the market to accelerate economic development
within the framework of the principle of equality in op-
portunity, necessitates a clear definition of the rules of
mixed economy. Such a definition will, on the one hand,
eliminate uncertainities in the market and consequently re-
duce the effect of the "risk factor" caused by the compe-
tition of the public sector and, on the other, serve to
shift public sector investments into the desired fields of
activity.
The rules of mixed economy are explained below:
(1) The static and dynamic efficacy of the economy
must be achieved mainly through the market mechanism. In
other words, economic decisions must be made on the basis
of free market prices.
(2) In fields where the public and private sectors
carry out productive activities side by side, the State
must ensure equality in opportunity and treatment.
(3) The State must ensure price stability and minimize
the deficiencies of the price mechanism through indirect
means such as tax, credit, money and foreign trade policies,
and it must prevent the creation of monoplistic tendencies
22

and the exploitation of consumers. In this way, it will
ensure the effective distribution of private sector resources
in fields to help the development of the economy.
(4) In particular, the State must undertake infra-
structural investments which accelerate the overall develop-
ment and make investments of a social welfare nature in
education and health services. This will help to improve
the welfare of the community.
(5) The policies to be adopted in the Plan period must
enable the private sector to take over the development of
the manufacturing industry in the long run. The public
sector must complete the investments already initiated and
must increase and improve the efficiency of the existing
production capacity. Moreover, the public sector must enter
those fields of industry which the private sector cannot
participate in despite the incentives and which may create
bottlenecks in the economy. Mixed enterprises must be pre-
ferred in the new fields of industry taken up by the public
sector, in order to increase the contribution of the private
sector to development efforts.
"In the mixed enterprises to be established through
the capital participation of the State or State Economic
Enterprises, measures must be taken to avoid the hegomony
of a limited number of persons over the capital and ad-
ministration of the enterprises." [Ref. 7.]
To increase the effectiveness of the communications sys-
tem of the private sector, the communications system existing
between the public and private sectors must be defined and





The most important advantage of this will be to save
the private sector from making mistakes in reaching fore-
sighted decisions on investments and production. This
will, thus, ensure the effective distribution and utiliza-
tion of resources without causing a waste in expenditures
in making efforts to achieve Plan targets. For this pur-
pose, the public sector must ensure the transmittal of the
necessary information to the private sector. The projects
of the private sector which are above a defined magnitude
must be required to be reviewed by the State Planning Or-
ganization, and if they are found to be in conformity with
development targets, they will benefit from incentives.
24

V. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY DURING THE PLAN
PERIODS
A. GENERAL GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
The First and Second Five-Year Plans (1963-1967, 1968-
1972) of Turkey have marked definite stages in the country's
economic progress. The First Plan (1963-1967) was instru-
mental in creating most of the basic infrastructure for
economic growth, while the Second Plan accelerated the pace
of industrialization. Consequetly, a substantial increase
in national and per capita incomes was achieved. The Gross
National Product (GNP) has shown an increase of about 651
during the period 1963-1971 rising from 108.7 billion TL
.
to 179.3 billion TL. The share of the agricultural sector
in the GNP decreased from 41.2% in 1963 to 28.1% in 1972,
while the share of the industry increased from 16.8% to 22.6%
during this period. Similarly, the per capita income has
risen from 3640 TL. to 4901 TL. During this period the
weighted average of the imports has grown at about 8.7%p.a.
while that of exports has grown at a rate of 7.0%. Accord-
ingly, the volume of the foreign trade has grown from $1.05
billion to $1.85 billion. During this period, investments
have increased from 16.7 billion to 32.4 billion TL. About
92% of the total investment figure of 215.4 billion TL. has
been realized through internal resources. Though the con-
tribution of external resources to total savings was subject
to annual fluctuations, the trend is one of gradual decrease.
25

The rate of literacy of the school age population have
increased from 401 in 1963 to 541 in 1970. During the same
period the percentage of inhabitants living in single rooms
has decreased rom 241 to 16%, Similarly, the percentage of
the population not benefiting from electricity has fallen
from 691 to 62% [Ref . 8]
.
In spite of the positive developments mentioned above
Turkey has not been able to provide complete solutions to
its problems. The problems of economic development will be
discussed later.
Turkey's approach to economic planning has been pragmatic
resulting in the achievement of an average rate of growth
only fractionally lower than the 1% envisaged in the first
two plans. The outcome of this approach is reflected in
some of the facts and figures stated above.
As regards the social infrastructure, the ultimate goal
of all efforts in the economic and social fields has been to
move as fast as possible towards the attainment of a "welfare
State" in accordance with Turkish Constitution and in line
with the cultural heritage of the country [Ref. 8]
.
It is sufficient to mention here that the economy has
witnessed a fairly high rate of growth during the planned
period. The investment ratios have gone up fairly well, both
because of the increasing domestic savings and the inflow of
foreign assistance. The economy has already undergone a
significant structural change which is evident in the rising
contribution of industrial sector to GNP, increasing employ-
ment and rising exports. In short, the indications are that
26

the economy now is poised for a more ambitious development
effort.
In the foregoing paragraphs the efforts and the achieve-
ments of the past ten years economic development in Turkey
has been outlined in general terms. It would, therefore, be
useful at this juncture to analyze these achievements in a
somewhat detailed manner.
B. RATE OF GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
During the past ten years the Turkish economy has achieved
a fairly high rate of growth in real terms. Indications are
that in the first two plan periods this rate of growth has
been only fractionally below the planned target of 7% (Table
I and Figure 1)
.
TABLE I. The Annual Growth Rates of GNP (at factor cost)












Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
Table II shows the actual rates of growth for the First
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Figure 1. The Annual Growth Rates of Sectors (Realization)
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This, being the average GNP rate of growth, necessarily
calls for subtracting the average population growth of 2.7%
per year resulting in a per-capita increase of 4.3%. This
compares favorably with the rates of growth of the OECD
countries which on the average have been about 4.8% during
the past ten years [Ref . 8] .
TABLE II. The Annual Growth Rates of the Sectors (at factor
cost)
First Plan Second Plan
Sector Target Actual Target Actual
Agriculture 4.2 3.2 4.1 3.1
Industry 12.3 9.7 12.0 7.6
Services 6.8 7.9 6.3 7.7
Construction 10.7 8.0 7.2 6.6
Transport 10.5 7.2 7.2 7.8
Housing - 8.1 5.9 8.2
Other Services - 8.0 6.0 7.9
Domestic Income 6.9 6.4 6.8 6.1
(at factor cost)
GNP 7.0 6.7 7.0 6.9
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972
The contribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP
has declined from about 31.5% to 28.1%, while that of indus-
trial sector has increased from 20.6% to 22.6% during the
Second Plan period. Within the industrial sector, the share
of manufacturing industries as compared to other branches
of industry has also increased substantially. This shows
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that the economy is becoming progressively industrialized
and its preponderant dependence on agriculture is diminish-
ing. The structural change in the economy has profound
implications for future growth rates. The high rate of
growth of manufacturing industries leads to an increase of
their relative weight which, in turn, is likely to have a
decisive influence on the aggregate rate of growth.
As seen in Table III and Figure 2, the share of indus-
trial sector in GDP and GNP has been rising which indicates
that it is becoming the leading sector in the economy as
envisaged in the Plans. The divergent growth rates of
agriculture, industry and services envisaged in the Plan
led inevitably to a structural change in the economy which
appears to be fairly pronounced despite the short span of
time (Appendix)
.
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Figure 2. Sectoral Contributions to GNP (Realization)
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C. INVESTMENT, SOURCES AND ALLOCATIONS
The investment as proposed in the Second Plan was of a
fairly capital-intensive kind compared to the First Plan.
For a capital-output ratio of 3.2 (excluding stocks), in-
vestment requirements were greater.
The actual overall supply and use of resources is given
in Table IV and Figure 3.
The share of fixed capital investment in GNP and its
financial resources are shown in Table V.
During the First Plan period, the marginal saving ratio
realized was 32.0%, while this ratio was 25.71 for the
Second Plan period.
The rate of increase of the public and private sector
investments and the share of the public and private sector
in total investment are shown in Table VI and Figure 4.
It can be seen in Table VII that the share of the pub-
lic sector in the total investment was below the target set
for the First Plan period. However, during the Second Plan
period the share of the public sector exceeded the Plan
target.
During the First Plan the capital-output ratio of 2.6
was realized. For the Second Plan period the capital-output
ratio of 3.0 was realized.
Most of the investment during the planned period has
gone into the fields of transport, energy, housing, educa-
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Figure 3. Use of Resources (as percentage of GNP)
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TABLE V. Sources of Capital Accumulation (As Percentage of
GNP)
First Plan Second Plan
Reali- Reali-
Target zation Target zation
The Share of Fixed
Investment in GNP 18.3 16.0 21.3 19.3
- Domestic Resources 14.8 14.2 19.4 18.0
- Foreign Resources 3.5 1.8 1.9 1.3
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
TABLE VI. Fixed Capital Investment by Public and Private
Sectors
.
First Plan Second Plan
Reali- Reali-
Type of Investment Target zation Target zation
Average Annual Rate of
Increase (%)
:
Total Investment 10.7 9.4 11.2 10.8
- Public Sector 10.6 8.5 10.0 10.7




100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
- Public Sector 59.9 52.4 52.6 53.1
- Private Sector 40.1 47.6 47.4 46.9
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TABLE VII. Sectoral Distribution of Investments (As Percent
age of Total Fixed Investments).
First Plan Second Plan












Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELDS OF PUBLIC FINANCE
1 . The Public Sector
The Public sector comprises the General and Annexed
Budgers, Local Administrations, Revolving Funds and State
Economic Enterprises.
During the first two plans, total public revenue
and expenditures have approached the levels envisaged in
the plans. However, the composition of the public expendi-
tures reveals that the realization in the field of public
current and transfer expenditures has been above the Plan
targets while the public investment expenditures was lower
than planned.
The targets and realization of public revenue and
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Figure 5. Public Expenditures (1963 - 1971).
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2 . Changes in the Budget Structure
Table IX below indicates the expenditure position
as regards to the Consolidated Budget during the past ten
years.
TABLE IX. Consolidated Budget Expenditures.
CURRENT PRICES
TL. MILLION
1962 1967 1968 1972
CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 9,368 19,130 22,432 51,968
Current Expenditures 4,654 9,736 11,024 26,397
Investment
Expenditures 2,375 5,104 6,132 9,455
Transfer Expenditures 2,339 4,290 5,276 16,116
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 100.0 100. 100.0 100.0
Current Expenditures 49.7 50.9 49.2 50.8
Investment
Expenditures 25.3 26.7 27.3 18.2
Transfer Expenditures 25.0 22.4 23.5 31.0
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
3. State Economic Enterprises
State Economic Enterprises (SEE) have been an effec-
tive tool in the implementation of the industrialization
programs and activities in Turkey. In spite of various ad-
ministrative problems that these organizations have faced,
their contributions to the adaptation of modern technology,
manpower training, creation of employment opportunities,
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production and price stability have been of great help to
the developmental efforts during the first two plan periods
The share of SEE's investments in the total public
investment and the sectoral breakdown of investment are
shown in Tables X and XI, respectively.











1964 1,830.7 5,427.2 33.7
1965 2,115.0 6,079.8 34.8
1966 2,928.2 7,854.9 37.3
1967 3,057.0 9,003.7 34.0
11,522.3 7"Z 11Q 7 34.8
1968 3,839.4 11,156.4 34.4
1969 4,809.5 12,763.3 37.7
1970 6,173.2 14,442.2 42.7
1971 6,975.0 16,202.5 43.0
1972 11,059.4 21,389.7 51.7
Total 32,856.5 75,954.1 43.3
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
TABLE XI. Sectoral Distribution of Public Investments and











SEE. Pub SEE Pub. SEE. Pub SEE Pub
1.9 16.1 0.5 17.8 9.0 17.7 0.2 10.5
17.1 6.6 15.8 6.4 10.0 4.5 11.8 7.2
27.2 10.2 38.8 14.4 41.2 15.6 57.8 31.3
17.5 8.9 16.2 12.4 18.8 13.8 41.0 13.2
36.3 58.2 28.7 49.0 29.1 48.4 16.2 37.1
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These tables show that during the Second Plan period
SEE's share was 43.3% in the total public investment; and
that during the same period their percentage contribution
to the manufacturing industries alone has risen from 41.21
to 57.8% of the total investment undertaken by these organ-
izations [Ref . 8]
.
E. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
1. Balance of Payments
Table XII and Figure 6 show the balance of payments
figures for the period 1963, 1968 and 1971. During this
period, foreign trade gap increased continuously. Total
exports realized during the period 1963-1971 were above the
plan targets. However, the structural change that the plans
envisaged with regard to exports was not achieved. In 1970,





A considerably' higher rate of increase in exports
along with greater share of industrial goods in total ex-
ports was aimed at in both plans. In spite of the positive
developments in this respect, agricultural goods still rep-
resents the greatest share in Turkish exports.
Table XIII shows the actual export figures during
1963, 1967 and 1971.
3. Imports
Imports realized during 1963-1971, were a little be-





320 -268 - 494
- 24 - 34 - 47
- 13 - 9 21
- 107 471
- 8 - 32 - 36















-IS ^?(or Proj ects)




Current Account Balance -327
II. CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS
1. Debt Repayments
2. TL Grain Imports
3. Private Foreign
2 i j, *cCapital
4. Project Credits 61 127 219
5. Program Credits 154 118 89
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16 20 2
- 29 37 379
22 9 6
-222 - 109





6. Imports with Waiver 5 22 27
7. Import with Credits
Capital Account
10 - -
Balance 239 208 344
Overall Balance -88 -14 235
III. IMF Net Positions 4 27 -
IV. Reserve Movements
(+Decrease) 48 6 -345
V. Special Drawing
Rights - - 11
VI. Short-term Capital
Movements -21 - -
VII. Net Errors and
Omissions 57 -19 99
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A. Cereals and Pulses 8
B. Fruits and Vegetables 87
C. Industrial Crops 150
2. Forestry Products 2








10. Food Industry 32
11. Textile Industry 3
12. Wood Products 1
13. Paper Industry
14. Hide and Leather Goods
Industry
15. Rubber and Plastic
Industry




19. Glass, Ceramics, Tiles
Industry
20. Cement Industry




















































































TOTAL 368,087 522,334 676,602




Table XIV gives the composition of imports. During
this period import substitution was given priority especially
in the fields of iron and steel, vehicles, chemicals, paper,
metal products, agricultural machinery and durable consumer
goods.

















197.0 313.0 62.0 372.0
206.0 423.6 35.1 684.7
251.0 431.0 119.2 801.2
340 .0 720.8 110.0 1,170.8
450.0 775.0 90.0 1,315.0
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
4. Invisible Items
Tourism and travel income did not reach the levels
foreseen in the first two plans. The positive effect of
tourism income on the balance of payments had been limited
in spite of the improvements during the last two years of
the Second Plan Period.
Workers' remittances had been the important factor
which contributed most positively towards the improvement of
the balance of payments.
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5. Foreign Private Capital
Only a small portion of the licenses issued to for-
eign private capital had been used. Nearly half of these
were in the chemicals and rubber industries.
6. Viability
Viability has been one of the main goals in both of
the two plans. While the inflow from invisible items such
as workers' remittances and tourism as well as the contri-
bution of concessional aid are regarded as short-term mea-
sures to reduce the balance of payments gap, it was the
increased share of industrial goods in total exports that
was being aimed at to reach viability.
During the period 1963-1971 total foreign credits
were around $240 million annually.
In this period, the amount of consortium credits
agreed upon was $2642 million. The creditors had preferred
"Project Credits" to "Program Credits," and 451 of the pro-
ject credits were given for infrastructure projects [Ref. 8].
7
.
European Economic Community (EEC) and Regional
Cooperation for Development (RCD)
During the planned period, the most important event
in the sphere of foreign economic relations was the decision
taken for the association with the European Economic Community,
The association was established with the Ankara Agreement
signed in 1963. The Additional Protocol which defined the
procedures during the Transitional Period was signed on 23
November 1970, and envisaged the accomplishment of a "customs
union" with the EEC in 22 years, possibly by 1995 [Ref. 8].
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Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) is an
economic and cultural cooperation among Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan. The Heads of the three States agreed on such co-
operation at a Conference held in 1964. The regional co-
operation covered the fields of trade, industry, tourism,
transport and communication, banking and insurance, and so-
cial and cultural affairs. In spite of the progress recorded
with regard to the joint purpose enterprises, the cooperation
in the field of industry could not reach the desired level




The production trends in Turkey depicted that a remarkable
shift had taken place toward more sophisticated industries
and also reflected the conscious developmental policies fol-
lowed during that period. The economic progress achieved
during the first two plan periods has had a visible impact
on the common man's material well being, the main indicators
of which are presented in Table XV.
As seen from the table, significant improvements took
place in the establishment of basic industries in particular
and in providing impetus for economic growth in general.
Both of these prepare the ground for an accelerated develop-
ment for the future Plan periods. Considerable progress
has also been recorded in electric power, railways, ports,


















TABLE XV. Economic and Social Indicators
A. ECONOMIC 1962 1972
1. Per Capita Income (I).
2. % Share of Agricultural Sector in GDP
(factor cost)
.
3. % Share of Industrial Sector in GDP
(factor cost)
4. % Share of Services Sector in GDP (factor cost
5. % Share of Consumer Goods Production in the
Mfg. Ind's.
6. I Share of Intermediate Goods Production in
the Mfg. Ind's.
7. % Share of Investment Goods Production in the
Mfg. Ind's.
8. Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (Thousand
TL)
9. % Share of Investment in GNP
10. Per Capita Steel Consumption (Kg)
11. Per Capita Cement Consumption (Kg)
12. Per Capita Coal Consumption (Kg)
13. Per Capita Cotton Textile Consumption (Kg)
14. Per Capita Electricity Consumption (KWh)
15. Net Nutrients Per Hectare (Kg)
B. SOCIAL
1. Population (Million persons) 29.2 37.5
2. Population Growth Rate (1960-1965) (1965-1970) 2.6 2.7
3. Labor Participation Ratio 44 38
4. % Share of Workers in Agriculture 77 65
5. % Share of Workers in Industry 8 11
6. % Share of Workers in Services 15 24
7. Ratio of Employment to Supply of Labor Force 92 89
8. Scholarization Rate in Higher Education 3.0 6.8
9. Scholarization Rate in General + Vocational
+ Technical Secondary Education (2nd cycle) 9.0 17.7
10. Scholarization Rate in Vocational + Technical
Secondary Education (2nd cycle) 3.7 6.7
11. Urban population as % of total 27 38
12. Number of persons per doctor 3,200 2,300
13. Number of persons per hospital bed 485 410
14. Number of radios per 1000 person 52 120
15. Per Capita Consumption of Animal Protein
(Gr/daily) 16.8 19.3
16. Per Capita Consumption of grains (Gr/daily) 730 674




In spite of the positive developments mentioned above,
Turkey has not been able to provide a complete solution to
its problems. The most pressing social and economic prob-
lems facing Turkey upon entry into the seventies are sum-
marized in the following chapter.
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VI. BASIC PROBLEMS OF TURKISH SOCIETY AND THE STRUCTURAL IM -
PEDIMENTS RESTRICTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH
ECONOMY
Although Turkey has become one of the most rapidly de-
veloping countries of the world in recent years, certain
economic and social structural impediments restrict the rate
of development.
A. RAPID GROWTH OF POPULATION
1. Situation
The increase in income, which is an accepted factor
in measuring development, and closely related to the increases
in population, the utilization of the rising income and the
per capita distribution of income cannot be attained when the
DODulation increase is close to the income increase. The
rapid increase in population results in a disproportionately
large percentage of young children and causes much greater
consumption needs. In addition, a rapid increase in popula-
tion effects the quality of investments by increasing the
demographic investments for maintaining past living standards
to the detriment of other investments. Since the rate of
growth in population determines the quality and quantity of
investments, the population factor gains an equal importance
with savings. Population is a factor which affects economic
development from two aspects. From the aspect of size it af-
fects the amount and breakdown of investments, and from the
aspect of its characteristics it supplies the required man-
power. Therefore, the objective of the population policy of
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Turkey is to improve the structure of population and to re-
duce the rate of population increase to such a level that
it will not hinder economic development.
The population policy adopted during the early years
of the Turkish Republic played an effective role in in-
creasing the population and in offsetting the fall in popu-
lation stemming from the First World War and the War of
Independence. At that time measures were taken to improve
health conditions, to decrease death rates and to increase
the birth rate. As a result, population increases far ex-
ceeding previous rates were recorded during the last fifteen
years. The rate of population increase during the periods
1950-55, 1955-60, 1960-65, and 1965-70 was 27.7, 28.5, 26.1
and 27.3 per thousand, respectively.
A change was deemed necessary in the population policy
to slow down the rate of increase, and in 1965 a new popula-
tion policy was put into effect. The core of this new popu-
lation policy is "family planning."
According to provisional results of the 1970 census
the population was 35.7 million. Table XVI and Figure 7
show the population of Turkey and its rate of growth for
selected years. Table XVII shows the rate of growth of pop-
ulation for other selected countries. Because of the rapid
population increase and high fertility rate, the density of
the young-age group increases. Table XVIII explains the
distribution of the three main age groups. The percentage












TABLE XVI. Population of Turkey and its Rate of Growth, 1927-
1970.
Average
Total Annual Rate of










Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.



















Source: U.N. "A Concise Summary of the World Population
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Figure 7. Population of Turkey, 1950-1970
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TABLE XVIII. Distribution of the Three Main Age Groups (%)
Age
Group 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
0-14 38.54 39.37 41.25 41.74 41.01
15-64 58.35 57.05 55.22 54.16 55.21
65 and over 33 3.58 3.53 4.10 3.78
To-tal 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
consequence of high fertility. Because of the economically
unproductive nature of this group, all their burden falls
on the economically productive 15-64 age group. In developed
countries the 0-14 age group constitutes 25-301 of the total
population. In Turkey, however, this ratio is 421. There-
fore, the burden of the economically productive age groups
which contribute to economic development increases. This
burden, called "dependency ratio," increases under the ef-
fect of the rise in population. The changes in the depen-
dency ratio are shown in Table XIX, [Ref . 8]
.
TABLE XIX. Change in the Dependency Ratio (per thousand).
Age Under Over







1955 9,475 860 13,729
1960 11,427 1,029 15,299
1965 13,102 1,286 17,003
1970 14,001 1,400 20,160
Another subject related to the age composition is
labor supply. The population increase in Turkey is a very
important factor in relation to employment since labor supply
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increases as a result of the high rate of population in-
crease. When the employment created falls short of the
labor supply, the difference results in an excessive number
of people working in agriculture or, in other words, in
disguised unemployment. Moreover, it results in open unem-
ployment in the non-agricultural sector.
An analysis of the distribution of labor among the
various sectors indicates the economic structure of Turkey.
Sixty-one point three percent of the population lives in
rural areas, and most of this population works in agricul-
ture. Table XX shows the Turkish population in rural and
urban areas, and Table XXI shows population in the main
sectors. According to the 1970 census, 63.7% of the eco-
nomically productive population works in the agricultural
sector, 19.2% in the industrial sector and 17.1% in ser-
vices. The population working in the three main sectors for
selected years is shown in Table XXII. The proportions of
those working in industry and services has followed a con-
stant upward trend.






































Social Service and Recreation
Total
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
TABLE XXII. Population in the Three Main Sectors (I).
Sectors 1955 1960 1965 1970
Agriculture 82 79 75 64
Industry 9 10 12 19
Services 9 11 13 17
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
The location and size of population settlements
creates, among the people forming such settlements, a dif-
ferentiation in the living patterns, interrelationships and
methods used to secure their subsistence [Ref . 12]
.
In addition to the characteristics stemming from the
size of the settlement, social and economic elements have an
important weight in the differentiation of the rural and ur-
ban populations. These social and economic elements are:
industrialization, non-agricultural activities, production
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depending on energy, specialization, institutionalization,
reduction in the size of the family, deterioration of tra-
ditions needed for division of labor, and vertical and hori-
zontal social mobility. Thirty percent of the population
lives in cities. There is an increase in the ratio of city
population with every successive year. During the period
1965-1970, the annual rate of increase in urban population
was 51.5 per thousand, thus, exceeding the rate of increase
in total population. The increase in the urban population
is the result of migration to the cities rather than the dif-
ference between births and deaths.
2 . Demographic Characteristics
With a growth rate of 2.7% in 1970, Turkey has one
of the highest rates of growth of population. The death rate
has decreased as a result of improved health conditions, but
the birth rate has not decreased at the same rate. Tables
XXIII and XXIV show the birth and death rates of Turkey and
developed and developing countries.
The high rate of growth of population leads to a
great amount of expenditure in the field of infrastructure
as well as various social services.
B. THE HIGH LEVELS OF OPEN AND DISGUISED UNEMPLOYMENT AND
LABOR PROBLEMS
In 1972 out of a 14.3 million labor force only 12.7
million are gainfully employed. Out of an average of 440,000
persons entering the working age annually, only 160,000 are

























































































































































































O ^"N <d b0
t— tJ
SO cd cd •Hc
ON d AJ cy\ r«1 lTn c
i-t O jd • • • • aJ
jd +J >-! t— -T\ rO rH
• *»
rt










Cm X 1 CM ro X3 r-1
« • • •
a> X o lAH O cd




















nJ o in o i>
« CD .r\ LT\ O -O ^3 C
>H ON CT\ T\ 1\ H <
1












is estimated that as of 1971 the number of uninsured and
non-unionized workers was of the following order: 600,000
agricultural workers, 3.7 million artisans, handicraftsman
and their apprentices, 5.9 million unpaid family workers in
agriculture and other independent workers [Ref . 8]
.
1. The General Situation
In the economically under-developed countries, the
reasons of and solutions for unemployment are different from
those in other countries. In the developed countries the
problem generally arises from a low level of effective de-
mand and from unutilized capacity. However, in under-de-
veloped countries the unemployment problem arises not from
a high propensity to save but from the lack of it [Ref. 13]
.
Moreover, it is not of a cyclical nature but has a
permanent character. This problem reveals itself both as
under-employment and disguised unemployment in the agricul-
tural sector and as open employment and low production in
the non-agricultural sectors. With these features, the prob-
lem can only be solved on a long-term basis, and it has eco-
nomic as well as social significance. The ratio of the
increase in employment and its distribution among sectors
affects the income distribution in an economy with a low
level of employment. Open unemployment causes a reduction
in wage levels and consequently aggrevates income distribu-
tion. Open unemployment in the cities indicates the limita-
tion of employment possibilities in the villages. A shortage
of manpower takes place in some regions during the seasons
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agricultural activities are heavy. The number of those who
have no permanent employment in agriculture for the greater
part of the year is still high. These are the seasonally
unemployed - they make up the total amount of unutilized pro-
ductive manpower together with those who are unemployed the
whole year, including during the agriculturally active sea-
sons. Economic growth and the solution to the employment
problem will be achieved when this manpower, which makes a
very small contribution to production, is used to its full-
est extent. Seasonal unemployment in agriculture is more
significant than permanent unemployment throughout the sea-
sons when it is considered from the standpoint of unutilized
capacity. Utilization of this source will not only solve
the unemployment problem to a certain extent, but it will
also aid in securing a high level of production by a smaller
capital. This, more than anything else, is a problem of
technology [Ref . 14]
.
2 . Development Trends
During the past decade, 15-64 year group's annual
rate of increase was observed to be higher than the increase
in employment opportunities. The result was an increasing
"unemployment figure." In numbers this was 2.9% and 1.2%
relatively. Total unemployment figures (agriculture and
industry) were 1,600,000. In 1972, out of a labor force of
14.3 million, only 12.7 million were employed.
Analysis of the employment situation revealed that
the biggest question of employment was a surplus of laborers,
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and the reason was a shortage of labor rather than a hidden
unemployment.
The employment in aricultural sector of 15-64 year
group did not change much during 1962-65 and decreased
500,000 in the period 1965-71. The main employment question
in this sector was seasonal changes. Additionally, seasonal
movement of workers created some social problems.
The employment distribution and progress in the sec-
tors other than agriculture is shown in Table XXV. In re-
cent years of the plan periods in the commerce and service
sectors, employment increases were highest.
TABLE XXV. Employment
Tioz 1967 1972
SECTORS ( thousand) * (thousand * (thousand) <fo
Industry 795 37.5 1.175 35.4 1.519 33.1
Building 305 11.5 369 11.1 433 9.4
Commerce 328 12.4 395 11.9 605 13.2
Transportation 258 9.7 325 9.S 450 9.8
Services 768 28.9 1.058 31.8 1.579 34.4
During the period 1967-72, a 6.6% increase in em-
ployment was achieved in sectors other than agriculture. That
was evaluated as the shift of labor force from agriculture to
other sectors. The total employment increase in the 1963-67
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period was 985,000 and in the 1967 - 72 period the employ-
ment increase was 1,195,000.
The employment of Turkish workers in foreign coun-
tries reduced the seriousness of the employment problem.
There were 650,000 Turkish workers outside of the country
in 1972.
3. Labor Relations and Labor Problems
Although the permanent laborers in 1963 constituted
21.61 of the economically active population, this percentage
increased to 29% in 1971, and the number was around 4 mil-
lion. One million four hundred thousand of those were laborers
with social security, 800,000 were government employees and
1.8 million were continuous farm laborers and artisans.
Labor problems emerged and changed according to the
individual and collective industrial relations between em-
ployee and employer at micro-level and employment; produc-
tivity and distribution in macro-level. On the other hand,
inequalities among workers changed according to the sector,
plant size and regulating rules and laws.
Labor laws, union and collective bargaining laws, were
effective especially on the working conditions of laborers in
areas other than agriculture. This group was around 1.4 mil-
lion and most of them had social insurance.
The continuous working group in agriculture was around
600,000 in 1971. Their wages and working conditions were
regulated by law. Work force and productivity in the sector,
changes according to the region, season and the type of pro-
duction. According to 1971 statistics average wages were TL
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15-2Q per day, but there were areas where wages were TL 35-40,
In some areas wages were below the legal minimum levels.
Laborers in small economic units were generally work-
ing in difficult conditions. The reasons were both financial
and difficulty of control. And their employment was almost
unregulated.
Strikes generally happened at collective bargaining
state. Lockouts have had a limited application during the
same period. According to the statistics only 78 employers
decided to lockout and 4226 workers suffered from that in
this period. The loss of working hours was around 200,000.
Working conditions, working hours, leaves, several
types of fringe benefits, and their minimum requirements were
mostly determined in relevant laws, but the practices indi-
cated considerable differences between organized sectors and
others
.
Labor export to other countries is important from
the points of view of employment and national income. The
Turkish labor force in foreign countries involved positive
results in reducing unemployment and earning balance of pay-
ments, but its social impacts such as adjustment, living
conditions, and divided families were considerable.
C. INSUFFICIENCY OF DOMESTIC SAVINGS AND FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS
Turkey's domestic savings have not been adequate to meet
the financing requirements of investments. Comparatively
speaking, savings are small as a result of low per capita in-
come, high and diversified consumption patterns of higher
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income strata, inadequate public finance and financial in-
stitutions, and the lack of an active capital market.
Generally, in countries like Turkey which are at the
threshold of development and which have a rapid increase of
population and income, the main factor that determines the
development rate is not the lack of demand but the promotion
of productive capacity as a consequency of increased in-
vestments. The increase in investments depends on the in-
crease in import capacity together with the promotion of
domestic savings to support the chosen growth rate. In
other words, economic development requires that larger in-
crements out of increasing income be reversed for savings.
In recent years, although there has been a positive de-
velopment in the Turksih economy and in its social institu-
tions, there are certain structural impediments and insufficiencies
that restrict the rapid increase of savings.
The main factor restricting the increase in savings is,
without doubt, the low general level of income which in turn
determines the level of savings. As a consequence of the low
income level, the part which can be set aside for savings
after the purchase of necessities is low. On the other hand,
the consumption level of the society has risen as a result
of the close relations which Turkey has established with the
advanced, high income nations of the world.
Although the savings generating entrepreneural group has
attained an ever increasing dynamism, it has not yet acquired
the anticipated power and expansion. As a result the level
of savings is low since the possibilities of using these
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savings in the most profitable way are restricted. Moreover,
the value judgements of the society and the social security
order effect the level of savings. In societies with close
family ties, savings are kept at a minimum to be able to
preserve the future consumption at a high level.
In addition to all these factors which restrict savings,
an effective system to mobilize dispersed savings has not
been adequately established. In other words, another reason
for restricted savings is the lack of an institutional system
to promote savings and distribute them effectively into pro-
fitable fields. The organization of such an institutional
structure and the strengthening and expansion of financial
intermediary institutions appears as the main problem when
the rhythm of industrialization has accelerated.
The share of domestic savings in GNP was 11.1% in 1962
adn 19.6% in 1972. The share of total investments in GNP
was 15.1% in 1962 and 21.0% in 1972. Table XXVI shows the
share of domestic savings and total investments in GNP for
several western countries including Turkey. It can be seen
that Turkey's domestic savings have not been adequate to
meet the financing requirements of investment, and Turkey
has a level of domestic savings and investments which is
smaller than other western countries.
D. STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE AND TRADE DEFICITS
Over the period of the First Five Year Plan (1963-1967)
merchandise exports increased from the equivalent of $381
million to $523 million, an average annual increase of 6.5%.
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TABLE XXVI. The Share of Domestic Savings and Total Invest-
ments in GNP (1972)
.






Source: U.N. "National Accounts Yearbook, 1972."
Over the Second Five-Year Plan (1968-1972) exports grew from
$523 million in 1967 to a provisional $840 million in 1972,
or at an average annual rate of 10%. Over the decade from
1962 to 1972 the average annual rate of increase was 8.21.
Had the period been limited to the nine years 1962-71, the
average annual growth rate would have been 6.6%, instead of
8.2%, reflecting the provisionally large growth in exports
in 1972 of 24.2%. It may be noted that the 1972 figures
reflect the deevaluation of the U.S. dollar of December 1971.
In 1970 tourism showed a net inflow, apparently for the first
time.
In both the earliest' (1963) and the latest (1971) years
of two plan periods, agricultural commodities overwhelmingly
dominated the makeup of exports (Table XVI and XXVII). Agri-
cultural commodities accounted for 72.6% of total exports in
1971.
In the agricultural category cotton had the first place,
followed by tobacco and the fruits, nuts, and vegetables
group. Both gave indication of some percentage decline, al-




















Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, State Planning
Organization, Ankara, 1972.
During the 1963-1971 period the most important recipient
of Turkey's exports was the EEC group of countries, notably
West Germany, followed by Italy and France (Table XXVIII).
Outside the EEC Turkey's largest market has been the United
States, although that market showed a downward trend over
the decade. This was even more noticeable in the case of
the United Kingdom, the next largest market. The European
communist countries, especially the Soviet Union, showed a
considerable tendency during the first plan period to in-
crease its acceptance of Turkish exports. During the second
plan period, however, that pattern seems to have been re-
versed. Because of the enlargement of the EEC in 1973,
Turkey's closer association with the EEC, the continued and
possibly rising level of financial assistance from the com-
munist countries, and Turkey's own emphasis on export stim-









































Value Percent Value Percent
61.9 61.8 131.0 19.4
10.9 3.0 22.8 3.3
16.1 4.4 48.9 7.2
7.6 2.1 24.4 3.6
43.4 11.7 39.4 5.8
139.9 38.0 266.5 39.3
2.6 0.7 8.8 1.3
7.7 2.1 9.5 1.4
47.1 12.8 32.2 4.8
3.8 1.0 5.6 0.8
21.1 5.7 64.8 9.6
1.1 0.3 2.7 0.4

























































Total 368.1 100.0 676.6 100.0
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Economic and
Social Indicators - Turkey, 1972.
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Over the period 1960-1971, the average rate of increase
in exports of 7.1% p. a. is comparatively low (Table XIX).
The table shows the average rate of increase in exports for
selected countries and Turkey.
TABLE XIX. The Average Rate of Increase in Exports (1960-71)








Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Statistics, 1973.
As mentioned above, the exports of industrial products
are very low. Table XXX shows the structure of exports for
selected countries in 1968.
TABLE XXX. The Structure of Exports for Selected Countries
(1968).









Source: O.E.C.D., Country Reports, 1969.
Over the period of the first two five-year plans, the
value of imports consistently exceeded that of exports. The





















Iron and steel and their products





















































Excavating and construction machinery
Agricultural machinery
Electrical machinery























































Total 687.6 684.7 1,170.8
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Economic
and Social Indicators - Turkey, 1972.
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During the first plan period the value of imports increased
by only some 10%, an average annual increase of 1.9%. The
export rate was 6.5% a year during the same period. Over
the Second Five-Year Plan period, on the other hand, im-
ports increased (provisionally) at an average annual rate
of some 16.3%. Over the 1963-72 decade as a whole imports
increased at a (provisional) average annual rate of 8.9%,
compared with 8.2% for exports. The result was a growing
spread between exports and imports.
Turkey's imports are divided into five main groups:
food and beverages; industrial raw materials; investment
goods; petroleum products; and miscellaneous. Over the period
of the first two plans the division remained fairly stable.
At both ends of the period the investment goods category
included 39 to 40% of the total. Industrial raw materials
declined over the period from some 33% in 1963 to around
26% in 1971, foodstuffs from 13% to about 6%, and petroleum
products from about 12.5% to around 10.5%. The miscellaneous
category took up the slack, rising from about 2% at the start
of the first plan to about 15% in 1971. Fertilizer imports
increased from 1.4% of total imports in 1962 to 2.7% in 1971.
On the contrary, agricultural commodities which dominate
the makeup of exports, industrial products continue to dom-
inate the makeup of imports (Table XXXI) . The imports of
intermediate and investment goods represent 90% of the total
imports
.
In the pattern of imports by country of origin over the
period of the first five-year plans, two facts standout.
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The first is the steep decline that occurred in the position
of the United States from 31% of the total in 1963 to less
than 15% in 1971 (Table XXXII).
The second fact is the substantial and apparently grow-
ing position of the EEC as the primary supplier of Turkey's
imports with almost 40% of the total in 1971. As was the
case in the pattern of exports, West Germany was well out
ahead among the EEC sources of exports to Turkey followed by
Italy and France.
After the EEC and the U.S., the U.K. was the next most
important of Turkey's suppliers during the period. It was
followed, among the non-EEC European and Scandinavian group
of countries (European Free Trade Association - EFTA) , by
Switzerland, albeit at some distance. Imports from the
European communist countries increased from about 7% in
1963 to about 13% in 1967 but decreased to 9.7% in 1971. As
in the case of exports, the Soviet Union was the most impor-
tant among the communist suppliers because of the bilateral
arrangement that governed its trade with Turkey.
In general, rapid development necessitates an acceler-
ated increase in investments. This relationship becomes
more important when carried on parallel to industrialization
because the acceleration of investment depends on the con-
current existence of two fundamental factors. On the one
hand, savings must be rapidly increased to a level sufficient
to support investments. On the other, the import capacity
must be increased to permit increased investments and to
enable the import of machinery, equipment and raw material
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3.6 0.5 4.1 0.4
76.7 11.2 111.5 9.5
11.3 1.6 17.5 1.5
8.5 1.2 57.7 4.9
2.2 0.3 4.2 0.4


















5.7 0.8 7.6 0.6
3.5 0.5 6.0 0.5
14.1 2.1 11.2 1.0
7.4 1.1 11.2 1.0
7.9 1.1 6.5 0.6
2.6 0.4 6.9 0.6
8.8 1.3 64.0 5.4





















Total 687.6 100.0 1,170.8 100.0
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Economic
and Social Indicators - Turkey, 1972.
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which cannot be produced at home but which are necessary for
the efficient use of established production capacity [Ref.
IS].
In the past, with the exception of several years, the
long-run trend of Turkish foreign trade is characterized by
the fact that it did not increase parallel to the increase
in national income. Hence, its effect was to restrict rather
than to induce economic development. In other words, one of
the main structural impediments to economic growth in the
past was the fact that the foreign trade sector or, to use
a more general concept, the balance of payments operation,
could not keep up with the general economic development.
In fact, between the years 1962-1966, GNP increased by
29.5% while the volume of foreign trade only increased by
20.8% with a resulting reduction in the total share of im-
ports and exports in GNP. In the long-run this situation
can be seen more clearly. Exports exceeded the level at-
tained in 1953 only in 1964 while the 1966 exports were
only 23.8% above the level of 1953. If, as a general rule,
it is poltulated that the increase in the volume of foreign
trade should exceed the increase in income, it can be seen
that during this period the foreign trade sector had a re-
stricting effect on economic development. If one considers
that in the same period of 1962-1966 total investment at
constant prices nearly doubled, it can be seen clearly that





As a result, recourse to foreign loans was necessary
since foreign trade could not keep up with the pace of
rapid development. However, 55% of the foreign aid secured
between 1962-1966, a figure amounting to $1372 million, was
used for the payment of principal and interest of former
debts. For this reason, foreign aid, particularly in re-
cent years, could not sufficiently help remove the impedi-
ments to rising the import capacity.
The necessity of a commensurate increase in the foreign
trade volume as industrialization accelerates has become in-
creasingly apparent. Although the rather large population,
land area and variety of natural resources that Turkey pos-
sesses reduces the dependence of economic development on
foreign trade, in the near future, when development and in-
dustrialization accelerate, the ability to increase the
import capacity will be a very important factor in deter-
mining the growth-rate.
The past decade has witnessed a significant accelera-
tion in Turkey's rate of economic expansion. Despite the
evident success of economic planning and responsible mone-
tary management, the balance of payments situation has been
a constant source of anxiety to the authorities throughout
the Plan periods. Basically, the problem is one of an
over-valued exchange. The lira was devalued from 2.8 TL. to
9 TL. to the dollar in 1958 and a "tourist rate" of 12 TL
.
to the dollar was introduced in 1968. One recent linear
programming analysis based on Turkey's 1963 input-output
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table suggested that, on the assumption that all imports
were competitive to domestically produced goods, the lira
was over-valued by 40% and, on a conservative estimate of
the extent to which some imports were complementary to the
production of Turkish commodities, over-valued by 95%.
Other observers have also concluded although not on the
basis of such a technical analysis, that the lira has been
over-valued by a substantial margin.
The First Five-Year Development Plan, 1963-1967, was
prepared on the assumption that foreign aid over the period
would average 3.5% of the GNP. The Aid Consortium for
Turkey was established in 1962 under the aegis of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development to pro-
vide this assistance, but aid delivered only averaged 1.8%.
In the event, exports exceeded targets in most of the First
Plan years, although falling below targets in the first two
years of the Second Plan, 1968-1972. The good export per-
formance was insufficient to overcome the problem caused
by the shortfall in foreign aid and serious liquidity prob-
lems arose. Table XXXIII shows Turkey's international
liquidity position since 1962.























The picture presented in the table is misleading as
the high 'degree of foreign trade regulation which exists
prevents balance of payments pressures from being mani-
fested in liquidity drains; both imports and exports from
Turkey are subject to control. Furthermore, accounting
methods were changed in mid-1969 resulting in serious in-
comparability of the last two figures shown in the table.
The continuous over-valuation of the lira has necessitated
both quota restrictions and high tariffs on imports and
special incentives to exporters. The import regime, which
was tightened still further in 1968, consists of a detailed
set of regulations designed to keep the volume of imports
within the projected foreign exchange acquistions. Ninety
percent of all Turkish imports are "planned," i.e., speci-
fied in the semi-annual Import Programs or in bilateral
agreements. The State Planning Organization is responsible
for advising the Ministry of Commerce on the details of the
Program. Depending on its priority, a commodity may be as-
signed to the liberalized list or to the quota list. The
State Planning Organization's Annual Program for 1969 pro-
posed that a number of additional commodities such as
tyres, pharamecuticals and motor vehicles should be added
to the liberalized list. The value of imports on the lib-
eralized list planned for 1970 has been raised. The in-
creased rates of prior deposits that importers have to place
in blocked accounts at the Central Bank and the long delays
before requests for currency are granted, running at 30 and
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43 weeks for industrial and merchant importers, respectively,
in mid-1970, have made liberalized imports almost as diffi-
cult to obtain as those on the quota list.
Exports, as mentioned above, have generally done better
than planned. Nevertheless, the shortages of foreign cur-
rency for crucially important capital equipment purchases
places a strong premium on the expansion of the country's
export activities. Around 75-801 of Turkey's exports are
in the form of unprocessed agricultural products. The tra-
ditional exports - tobacco, cotton and hazelnuts - have not
found buoyant markets in the recent past and diversification
is being encouraged. With the assistance of the World Bank,
exports of fresh fruit and vegetables, processed food and
livestock are planned, together with a considerable increase
in manufactured exports. In the latter field, however, prob-
lems of quality, standardization and market research are
still serious. Rebates and preferential interest rates on
bank loans, in addition to the priority on import licenses
given to foreign exchange earners, do not appear to provide
sufficient incentives at present to stimulate rapid develop-
ments in the export field. High raw material and capital
costs coupled with wage bills not much lower than those
faced by comparable European firms have not given Turkish
exporters any significant competitive advantages. A heavy
drain on foreign exchange receipts appears to be the result
of a substantial amount of smuggling. In the final analysis
one is forced back to the problem of an over-valued lira.
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Turkey's invisible earnings have grown considerably in
the past decade, primarily as a result of remittances from
Turkish nationals working in Europe (predominatly Germany)
;
the rate of 12 TL. to the dollar applied for such transac-
tions. The tourist industry has only just started in earnest
and, so far, tourist receipts have been rather disappointing.
However, the introduction of a high-grade petrol in 1969,
the expansion in the number of good hotels and clean camping
sites along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, as well as
much work on excavating and restoring the wealth of Greek and
Roman remains in these regions, augurs well for the industry's
future
.
The inflow of private foreign capital in recent years
has increased substantially. Since 1967, the process by
which applications are dealt with by the Department for In-
vestment Implementation and Encouragement has been made much
less cumbersome. Although there is relatively small amount
of foreign capital in Turkey at present, the Government's
new policy to strengthen heavy industry in part with private
foreign capital and the simplified permit formalities sug-
gest that there is scope for large increases in the future.
The Turkish economy appears to have been following a
satisfactory development path in 1969 with a growth in GNP
of 6.3% and a rate of inflation of 6.01. The balance of
trade was -$264m. compared to -$162m. in 1967 and -$268m
in 1968. Despite a disappointing net deficit on tourism,
the rapidly increasing inflow of Turkish workers' remittances
which reached $141m in 1969 financed the deficits on tourism
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and travel (-$5m.) and on interest payments (-$39m.). It
reduced the current account deficit to -$215m. compared to
-$115m. in 1967 and -$242m. in 1968 [Ref. 8].
The current account deficit was more than offset by
the capital account surplus. Despite the ever-growing for-
eign debt repayment item (-$108m.), this surplus stood at
$259m. in 1969 compared to $175m. in 1967 and $235m. in 1968.
The overall favorable balance of $44 ($60m. in 1967 and $llm.
in 1968) was offset by a negative net errors-and-omissions
figure resulting in no change in the reserve position. How-
ever, new accounting practices with respect to the reserves
makes this a meaningless figure. In terms of the composition
of this aggregate picture there was a significant rise in
the proportion of trade conducted with EEC countries, whilst
the proportion of trade undertaken with both the USA and the
UK declined.
Despite an apparently satisfactory growth and price rec-
ord over the past few years, both the O.E.C.D. and the I.M.F.
have been dissatisfied not only with Turkey's balance of pay-
ments situation but also with the Government's fiscal and
monetary management. In 1969, the O.E.C.D. required an un-
dertaking from the Government that the volume of domestic
credit would rise only marginally; the I.M.F. has for some
time set guidelines for the extent to which the Central Bank
may lend to the State Economic Enterprises. Pressure was
also brought to bear for the enactment of the law limiting
the proportion of the Budget which may be financed by the Bank,
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It seems paradoxical that Turkey's balance of payments
position should have been regarded as critical in mid-1970
when the average rate of inflation had been moderate and
exports had done well. Two factors are primarily responsible
for this situation: the disappointing foreign aid record
and the initial over-valuation of the lira at the outset of
the planning period. Furthermore, the rapid growth in the
real level of GNP has stimulated demand for imports of capi-
tal equipment to such an extent that delays in the acquisi-
tion of foreign exchange for these purchases now appear to
be the major bottleneck to industrial expansion.
The Turkish authorities have viewed another devaluation
in the same light as the worsening terms of trade which have
taken place ever the past two decades and have tried to re-
sist international advice and persuasion. However, with the
O.E.C.D. aid appropriations seriously delayed and the I.M.F.
exerting strong pressure, the Government announced a devalua-
tion on 10 August 1970. The lira was devalued from 9TL.
(and from the tourist rate of 12 TL.) to 15 TL. to the dol-
lar. A set of monetary and fiscal measures were initiated
at the same date to check any inflationary pressures which
might otherwise have been generated in its wake.
It is impossible at this time to predict whether or not
the devaluation and accompanying measures will have any sig-
nificant impact either on the long-run balance of payments
position or on the structure of the economy. The fact that
the lira is still over-valued suggests that important struc-
tural changes are unlikely to occur as a result of this action,
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Nevertheless, there are certainly a number of industries
which might now become export oriented. This will take
time, and the relative price movements in Turkey vis-a-vis
the rest of the world will be a critical factor over the
next five years. Furthermore, much will depend on the ef-
fort which is put into marketing already mentioned as a
serious constraint to the existing export activities. With
sufficient attention paid to these two factors, the de-
valuation may act as a moderate stimulus to exporting which
is to receive further encouragement from the provision of
additional credit facilities at subsidized interest rates.
However, whether self-sufficiency by the mid-1970's will
be achieved, even if such favorable conditions are present,
is questionable.
E. LOW LEVEL OF INCOME AND ITS UNBALANCED DISTRIBUTION
The per capita income of $364 in 1972 is the lowest
among European countries. This is 1/6 of average income
level of EEC countries. Table XXXIV shows per capita in-
comes for EEC countries.
TABLE XXXIV. Per Capita Income for EEC Countries, 1969

















Although the development plans based on the principle
of justice in all areas, unequality in the size distribution
of- income has remained a major social and economical problem
throughout the plan periods. For the lack of sufficient
data no definite conclusions can be drawn. However, accord-
ing to a survey held by O.E.C.D. in 1968, a minority of 191
of total population received 57% of total income during the
year 1967.
F. PRODUCTIVE STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY
Another important factor restricting the development is
the lack of "economic organization." More clearly, the pre-
sent system for the transfer of potential savings to more
productive fields and for the effective use of investment
opportunities is not operating efficiently, and the appro-
priate organization to provide such an operation has not yet
been established.
1 . Agricultural Organization and Efficiency
To a great extent, economic development depends on
agriculture. The nature of the changes in agricultural pro-
duction has a two-fold effect on the Turkish economy and so-
ciety: (1) the general economic development is unstable because
of its dependence on weather conditions, (2) this instability
creates various economic and social problems within the sector.
It is impossible to remove completely the fluctuations
in agricultural production and prices. However, by removing
the factors that make these fluctuations more severe the un-
favorable effects on economic development can be reduced.
The most important factor that increases agricultural prices
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and production instability in Turkey is the malfunctioning
of the agricultural organization.
The most important factor restricting agricultural
development is the mobility of farmers to form large organi-
zations of their own. The trend of small land-owners to
integrate by means of cooperative is not widespread.
2 . Industrial Organization and Efficiency
There are organizational bottlenecks that greatly
restrict development and efficiency in the industrial sector.
The basic investment goods industry is inadequate.
In the manufacturing industry particularly, there are many
entrepreneurs actively operating small, separate enterprises.
Hence, it is not possible to produce at even the minimum
economic capacity (optimum operating size) and to benefit
the rapidly developing production and management techniques
of the industrialized countries. In addition, facilities
for making and applying industrial research have not been
developed.
The coordination and organizational difficulties of
public enterprises producing industrial goods have not been
eliminated. To increase the productivity of public industrial
enterprises that were established through large investment,
specialization in production, development of technical ser-
vices and efficiency in marketing activities are necessary.
Tables XXXV and XXXVI show that Turkish industry is
mainly composed of consumption goods, and there is no signi-
ficant increase in the industry of investment goods in the
last ten years term.
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TABLE XXXV. - The Composition of Production Industry {%)
Production 1962 1967 1972
Consumption Goods 62.3 52«9 46.6
Intermediate Goods 27 .0 35*4 39.
4
Investment Goods 9.9 11.
7
14.0
Production Industry 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Third Five-Year Plan, State Planning Organi
zation, Ankara, 1972.
TABLE XXXVI. -The Composition of Production for Selected Countries (1967)
Production Turkey Developed Economies Developing Economies
Consumption Goods 5^«9 20.0 39*0
Intermediate Goods 35»4 35*0 36.
Investment Goods 11.7 45*0 25.0
PRGjjUCTIOLi IHiUSTHY 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: U.N. , "Statistical Yearbook, 1970".
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3. Services and Infrastructures
Social and economic infrastructure investments play
an important role in the acceleration of development. Al-
though Turkey has reached a relatively high level of infra-
structure investments when compared with similar countries,
the rate of economic development that the Turkish economy
had attained by the beginning of the seventies and the ob-
jectives set forth for the future; necessitate the strength-
ening of the social and economic infrastructures.
G. A COSTLY AND SLOW-FUNCTIONING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Public administration, although in some places modern,
is on the whole outdated. Coordination and cooperation in
joint decision making and efficient operation have not been
achieved. There is too large an increase in numbers and
salaries of government employees. There is also an imbal-
ance in geographical distribution of government employees.
Local authorities cannot meet the people's needs with their
own resources. There is also no clear-out division of duties
between local and central government authorities.
H. PROBLEMS OF SETTLEMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Migration to urban areas from rural areas between 1960-
1965 was 880,000 and between 1965-1970 was 1,300,000. The
development of urban units showed that migration had been
towards the urban units which have a population. .higher than
50,000 and large urban centers. In 1970 the ratio of popu-





QOQ to the total population was 31.11. The ratios of
urban population to the total population were 26.31 in 1960
and 35.9% in 1970.
The state has not been able to meet the infrastructural
and social requirement of the rapid urbanization of the past
two decades. On the other hand the needs for extra roads,
drinking water, electricity, etc. in the rural areas have
not been met by the local authorities. As far as the public
sector is concerned, the heavy pressure of demand for ser-
vices in the • rural areas has been a factor to prevent further
emphasis on production-oriented investments [Ref . 17] .
I. INADEQUATE EDUCATION SERVICES
In general, the formal education system does not conform
to the needs of economic and social development, nor is it
susceptible to changes. The informal education system also
has proven inadequate to improve the manpower productivity
necessary for higher production. Primary education does not
provide the basic needs for further education or for a prac-
tical life. Only 841 of the population between the ages of
7 and 12 years attend primary school education. Secondary
schools, on the whole, simply prepare children for higher
education, although it is recognized that vocational and
technical education is necessary at this stage. Only 6.81
of the population between the ages of 19 and 22 years attend
higher educational institutions. Besides, higher education




The rate of economic development accelerated significantly
between the pre-planning (prior to 1963) and planning periods
(since 1963). Real national income increased by 501 since
the beginning of plan periods. In the course of rapid growth,
however, serious dislocations developed which were reflected
in inflation and balance of payments difficulties, and which
have increasingly interred with continued economic develop-
ment. The Turkish economy has been suffering from the grow-
ing pressures of excess demand, resulting mainly from an
investment effort exceeding the real resources available to
finance it. An ambitious investment drive was launched, but
no effort was made to restrain consumption demand in the face
of rising incomes.
A fact of particular significance for Turkish economic
development was the very limited increase in savings, volun-
tary or through taxes,, out of rising agricultural incomes.
This can be attributed to certain features of the Turkish
economy and the government's fiscal and monetary policies.
There had been a strong relationship between the rate
of growth and the ICOR's (incremental capital output ratio)
throughout the entire period, and highly significant struc-
tural change in the relationship between the periods. The
ICOR has shown a strong negative relationship with respect
to the rate of growth in GNP.
The ICOR in Turkey has become increasingly influenced
by the public sector, as the proportion of public investment
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in the total has increased. This, in turn, might be attributed
to the project appraisals conducted by the State Planning Or-
ganization and implemented by the public sector over the plan-
ning period. Also, that gives a valid implication that the
fall of ICOR has been significantly influenced by the public
sector, as project evaluations are conducted more efficiently.
In addition to failing to raise public revenue as much
as planned (primarily due to the government's refusal to im-
plement the planned agricultural tax reforms) , the principal
shortcomings in policy formulation and execution were an
over-valued currency which necessitated exchange controls
and distorted the allocation of resources, the continued re-
liance on price regulation, and the failure to reform ade-
quately the State Economic Enterprises.
The lack of well organized investment opportunity sur-
veys remained a major bottleneck, and was one of the reasons
for planned investment in the public sector failing to reach
the planned level, and for the allocation of private invest-
ment diverging from the intended pattern.
The amounts of financial assistance offered were smaller
than planned and the terms harder. Although nearly one-half
of financial aid offered was necessary to make repayments on
already outstanding debts, the share of foreing aid and for-
eign borrowing has been gradually reduced during the proceed-
ing plan periods. This considerably reduced the dependence
of the Turkish economy to the foreign resources.
The balance of payment deficit over the plan periods was
less than had been forecasted. Exports were better than had
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been expected, not due to an increase in sales abroad of in-
dustrial goods, but rather attributed to an expansion of
agricultural products such as cotton and tobacco. Invisibles
too were better than had been forecasted, despite higher in-
terest payments and the failure of tourist revenues to im-
prove. The main item on the invisible side which made the
difference was the unforeseen fast growth of workers
remittances
.
The recent upsurge in the growth rate has been caused
primarily by the substantial increase in the level of invest-
ment. The failure to attain the 71 rate of growth in GNP
was largely due to delays which occurred in the implementation
of investment projects.
Although the structure of the economy retained the agri-
cultural characteristics during the plan periods, increases
took place in the relative share of the industrial and ser-
vices sectors. During the plan periods, a structural change
in the direction foreseen in the plans, was -realized, al-
though at a lower rate. Economic development in every phase
was influenced by agricultural output due to the current
weight of the agricultural sector in the economy.
The Turkish governments did not have a strong policy
to create enough working areas to employ the expanding labor
force or to reduce the rate of the growth of population.
The excessive growth of population started to cancel the
rate of the growth of GNP significantly.
A costly and slow- functioning public administration ef-
fected the rate of growth of the Turkish economy inversely.
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APPENDIX. A: PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AMONG COUNTRIES
IN MARKET ECONOMIES AND TURKEY
Historical studies of some countries (variation over time)
and comparisons among countries at different income levels
(variation among countries) proved that there are uniform
patterns of change in the structure of production, as income
levels rise.
This study consists of estimation of multiple regressions
describing intercountry growth patterns for major sectors
(industry and primary production) and country groups, which
provide a more satisfactory treatment of the effects of dif-
ferences in income level scale.
A. THE CROSS-SECTION SHARES IN PRODUCT (VARIATION AMONG
COUNTRIES)
A development pattern may be defined for a given country
by the time paths of variables describing production, inter-
national trade, and some other variables in each sector. A
comparable cross-section pattern may be defined by the varia-
tion in the same set of variables, among countries at a
given moment in time. The two patterns can be compared by
expressing both as functions of per capita income and other
variables
.
The intercountry pattern of any year is generated by the
intertemporal development patterns of all countries in prior
years. If each country's pattern is dominated by a set of
universal factors common to all, the cross-section relations





The universal factors suggested in studies to explain
the intercountry uniformities include:
1. Similarities in production relations.
2. Similarities in domestic demand.
3. Similarities in opportunities for trade and interna-
tional capital movements.
In a world in which growth took place mainly through
capital accumulation, without much change in tastes, tech-
nology, or economic organization, it is possible to observe
common features of each country's development that would
carry over directly to the cross-country pattern. The addi-
tion of changing technology and organization makes the re-
lation betwen the two patterns less predictable. While the
introduction of new products may cause shifts in demand
functions that modify, or even reverse, the existing inter-
country pattern. For the purpose of empirical analysis, the
effects of these variables on the patterns considered
negligible
.
An investigation will be conducted to determine which
factors in intercountry relations can be adequately reflected
by adding variables in a multiple regression analysis, or
will require different functional forms for the equations.
The sample of 54 countries in market economies is dis-
tributed over the range, from least to most developed, with
the advanced countries comprising only a quarter of the total
(Table XXXVII)
.
The dependent variables in the regression equations are
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share of industry -SOI (manufacturing and con-
struction) .
The explanatory (independent) variables are:
1. x: Per capita GNP (in 1960 dollars) - PCG
2. N: population (in millions) - POP
3. k: share of gross fixed capital formation in GNP
(I/Y) - SOC
4. x : share of manufactured exports in GNP (E /Y) - SME
5. x : share of primary exports in GNP (E /Y) - SPE.
In order to measure the proximity and parameters of the
relationship between dependent variables and independent
variables, an analysis was carried out of the way in which
these figures were coupled in the case of all countries in
market economies for which the required data were found
available. The year 1960 was chosen because the required
data were available for the largest number of countries.
For quantitative comparisons of economic structure, the
values of the variables are used as a basis for subdividing
the sample into groups of countries that are expected to
have more homogeneous growth patterns. This approach was
preferable when there was a complex interaction among the
explanatory variables that may have required different func-
tional forms, although it had the disadvantage of reducing
the size of the sample.
Linear functions were not satisfactory to reflect the
relationship between dependent variables and independent
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variables, when they were compared to the logarithmic func-
tions: standard errors of estimate for each pair of vari-
ables were too high, and scatter diagrams of each pair of
variables were not satisfactory.
Logarithmic equations below explain the relationships
better than the linear equations mentioned above.
(a) Any = a + b. Jinx
(b) Any = a + b, Anx + b~(Anx) 2
(c) Any = a + b-,Anx + b~(Anx) 2 + b, AnN
(d) Any = a + b-^nx + b
2
(Anx) 2 + b_ AnN + b.Ank + b^Anx
+ b, Anx
6 p
(e) Any = a + b, Anx + b., AnN.
Scatter diagrams (Figures 8, 9 and 10) and standard errors
of estimate of these new variables proved that these equations
better explained the relationships.
Regression equation (a) explained the relationship better
for primary production while regression equation (b) explained
the relationship better for industry (Tables XXXVIII-XLII)
.
The nonlinear income term (Anx) 2 is used to determine
whether there was a decline in elasticities with rising in-
come noted in most industrial sectors (Figures 8b, 9b, and
10b) . This formulation was used to avoid the necessity of
subdividing the sample by income level.
To determine whether large countries have different
growth patterns from small ones, the sample was divided into
groups having populations above and below 15 million. The
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the regression results. The large country regressions (Fig. 8)
showed that the industrial share rose at a rapid rate during
the early phase of growth, but then reached a peak at a per
capita income of $2300. By contrast, the small country re-
gressions showed a lower income elasticity in the early
phases, but no tendency decline at higher levels, since re-
gression coefficient of (£nx) 2 was not significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
Next, the effects of natural resources and trade patterns
in the small country were taken up. Rich natural resources
had an opposite effect from size, on the timing of indus-
trialization. Concerning balance, they shift comparative
advantage away from industry because the resource cost of
earning foreign exchange through primary exports is lower.
There is no single criterion for classifying countries
according to resource endownments. We have, therefore, di-
vided the small countries into two equal groups on the basis
of an index of trade orientation - toward primary or manu-
factured exports, modified in marginal cases by consideration
of agricultural resources and the existing industrial
structure
.
The regression results for the small industry-oriented
and small primary-oriented groups proved that the regression
coefficients to be the same, was strongly rejected.
The three development patterns provide a substantially
different view of the interaction of the main explanatory
variables from the pooled regression. The three patterns
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had substantially lower standard errors of estimate, and
hence are statistically more satisfactory.
•In 1971, Kuznets studied cross-section shares in products
for some 57 countries grouped in increasing order of per
capita product in 1950, and concluded that "the share of the
A sector, agriculture, is inversely correlated with per capita
product: it is more than 501 in the lowest income group and
as small as 91 in the top group. The share of the I sector,
industry, is closely and positively associated with per cap-
ita product: it is less than 201 of aggregate product in
the lowest income group and more than 50% in the high income
groups" [Ref. 16]. These results, generally confirm the re-
sults of the year 1960 studied here in (Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11)
Figure 12 shows the scatter diagrams for all countries.
B. THREE DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS
1. Large Countries
The large country pattern of Figure 2 shows industry
rising rapidly from 161 of GNP at an income of $100 to 321
at $400. Thereafter the increase is much slower and a peak
share of 371 is reached at $1200. Primary production falls
steadily and crosses the industry curve at a level of $260,
where the share of each is 27%. For both sectors the fit
is extremely good; less than 101 of the variance in the
shares remain unexplained by regression equation (d)
.
Apart from size and income, only the share of invest-
ment is important for large countries in regression equation
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Figures 8a and 8b show that among large countries
there are few significant deviations from the average pat-
tern. Turkey's industrial share is lower than its predicted
industrial value. In primary production, its primary share




The patterns for this group is very similar to the
large country pattern. Industry equals primary production
at about the same income level ($270). The export variables
are important for this group of countries. The share of in-
vestment, on the other hand, has a lesser effect is small
countries, since capital goods are largely imported (Figure
9 and Table XLI)
.
3. Small Primary-Oriented Countries
The countries oriented toward primary exports have
a development pattern different from the first two types.
Primary production declines much more slowly and exceeds
industry up to an income level of nearly $800. Variation
in the trade patterns has lesser effect on the share of in-
dustry in this group (Figure 10 and Table XLII).
C. LONG-TERM TRENDS IN SHARES (VARIATION OVER TIME)
Kuznets and some other economists have studied the rela-
tion between long-term changes in shares over time and their
conformity to the cross -section associations [Ref. 16] for
some developed countries, and a few less developed countries
for which long records were available. The time-series paths
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and industry obtained from this study are plotted in Figure
11, for comparisons to the large country pattern in Figure 8.
Figure 11 shows considerable similarity in the overall
pattern of structural change that has taken place in the ad-
vanced countries. The rise of industry has been quite con-
sistent with the cross-country patterns. The fall of the
primary share has been even more pronounced than the postwar
pattern; on the average, movement along the cross-section
regression for large countries would explain about 801 of
the observed decline in these countries. This downward shift
has persisted into the postwar period.
D. CONCLUSIONS OF THE ECONOMETRIC STUDY
1. Three distinct development patterns have been iden-
tified from intercountry analysis: large countries, small
industry-oriented countries, and small primary-oriented
countries. The variation of production levels with income
is best described by separate regression equations for each
group, because income levels interact differently for each.
2. Time-series analyses of growth paths supported the
hypothesis that universal factors affecting all countries,
reflected in the intercountry patterns. Although individual
country differences cause substantial variation, the central
tendencies of the time-series estimates were close to the
corresponding cross-section estimates in all cases.
3. The results of this study proved that the international
cross -section comparisons may provide a sound basis for pro-
jecting trends in production structure of Turkey either back-
ward into the pass or forward into the future. However, if
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any disparities that emerge between the results of cross-
section comparisons and these of direct observations of
trends over time in the course of economic growth of Turkey
help identify the specific factors that operate in growth
over time but are not reflected in cross-section data.
According to these results, Turkey stays right in the
middle of the large country pattern (Figures 3 and 4) . Time-
series analyses of postwar period for Turkey shows some de-
cline in primary production and some increase in industry
as discussed in Chapter V of this study. This provides a
sound basis for projecting trends in production structure
of Turkey either backward or forward on the large country
pattern.
E. THE TECHNIQUES WHICH ARE USED TO ANALYZE THE REGRESSION
EQUATIONS
1. Test Whether All Slopes are Jointly Equal to Zero
H : $* =
H
1
: ALL SLOPES ARE NOT EQUAL TO ZERO -










If all slopes are not significantly different from
zero, then we conclude that none of the independent variables
is making a statistical contribution to the explanation of
the dependent variable at the stated level of significance.
In other words, none of the explanatory variables has an in-
fluence on the mean of Y if the null hypothesis is not true,
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at least one of the regression slopes is different from zero.
If the null hypothesis is true, then the variation of Y from
observation to observation is not affected by changes in any-





Test That a Single Coefficient is a Given Constant
(or Zero)
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If a slope is determined not to be significantly dif-
ferent from zero, then the variable associated with that
slope is making no statistical contribution to the explana-
tion of the dependent variable [Refs. 20 and 21].
3. Test of the Equality of Coefficients for Different
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If we conclude that all coefficients are equal, then,
one regression line will serve in place of three regression
equations. That is, we can pool all the data together. More
specifically, the sum of the squared residuals of pooled data
will not be significantly different from the total of the sum
of squared residuals of the three individual equations [Refs.
20 and 21]
.
4 . Test of the Correlation Ratio to Find Whether or Not
a Functional Relationship Exists Between the Dependent
Variable and the Independent Variable
H : n = There is no functional relationship
o r
H, : n f There is functional relationship
PAT F EXPL VAR / K-l n
2
/ k- 1
UNEXPL VAR / n-K " 1 _
-
2/ n . K
CRT F v , ,ra;K-l ,n-K
FrAI < FrDT ACCEPT H .CAL CR1 O
The degree of regressional relation between dependent
and independent variable is n 2 = Explained Variation / Total
Variation. To find whether or not a functional relationship
exists between Y and X, we test the correlation ratio. If we
do not reject the hypothesis then we conclude there is no
functional relationship between Y and X.
If Y and X have no regression relationship, then for
the samples we expect that the line representing conditional
means Y- will be horizontal and correspond to the line repre-
senting the grand sample mean. That is Y. = Y.
.
, and explained
variation will be zero [Ref. 20].
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5. Test Whether These Three Regression Equations Have















n-p(K+ l) CRT Fa;r(p-l),n-p(K + l)
FCAL < FCRT ACCEPT Ho-
In economic research the intercept of a regression
equation is generally of less consequence than the slope.
Therefore we are interested in testing the hypothesis that
only the slopes are equal among three regression equations.
That is we want to test whether the effect of independent
variables upon dependent variable is the same for the three
regression equations (for the conditional classifications)
[Refs. 20 and 21]
.
6. To Test Whether or not the Column Means, y -,
j=l,2,3, Which are Estimated by Y* . are Equal





H : y #1 = y._ = y._ = Y (for the dep . variable)
ti
1







FCAL < FCRT ACCEPT V
After testing all three regression equations have same
slopes (EQUALITY OF SLOPES), we test whether or not the column
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*means, u..(j=l,2,3) which are estimated by Y.
.
, are equal.
This technique combines the features of analysis of variance
and regression. We wonder whether or not the mean per cap-
ita manufacturing differs among the three regression equa-
tions (conditional classifications). Regression analysis
provided us with the estimated slope 3. Then, after ad-
justing for the effect of the concomitant variable, we do an
analysis of variance on the adjusted dependent variable. The
discrepancy between S* and S? is small if the null hypothesis
is true. If it is true condiction classification is of lit-
tle influence upon the per capita manufacturing when GDP per
capita and population is taken into account [Ref . 20 and 21]
.
7. If a Functional Relationship Exists Test that Popu -
lation Regression Relationship Between Dependent and
Independent Variable is Linear (Test for Linearity)
H : The relationship is linear
o ^
H, : The relationship is nonlinear





) / (K-2) CRT F
.
„ 9 „
(1 - n 2 ) / (n-K)
a,K-2,n-K
FCAL > FCRT •'• REJECT V
If a functional relationship exists we want to test
the relationship is linear or nonlinear (specification error
deviation will be zero if the true functional relationship
is linear). If we reject the null hypothesis, we conclude




H : a 2 = a 2 = a\ = a 2
O 1 L 3














If we accept H , the variance of disturbances will be
o
same and constant for each group at a = .05. There will be
no heteroskedasticity [Ref. 20].
OR
A quick way to test for heteroskedasticity is to look
at the scatter diagram of residuals. If the residuals seem
to become larger as the value of explanatory variable in-
creases there will be heteroskedasticity [Ref. 21]
.
9 . Testing for Autocorrelation
H : = (no first-order autocorrelation)
o
v
H, : ?* (there is autocorrelation)











= 1.65 (for one independent variable
and 76 observations, and for
a 0.05 critical region.)
If d
L
< dy < d < 4-dy < 4-dL ACCEPT H q .
If we accept H there is no autocorrelation at ther o





A quick way of determining the presence of autocor-
relation is to note the pattern of the residuals from regres-
sion line. This can be done most expeditiously by looking
at the scatter diagram of the residuals about the regression
line. If the residuals seem to follow a pattern, the error





1. Tinbergen, J., The Design of Development, The Economic
Development Institute- International Bank, The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1966
.
2. Okyar, 0., "The Concept of Etatism," Economic Journal
v. 39, p. 98-111, March 1965.
3. Hershlag, Z. Y., Turkey: The Challenge of Growth
,
Leiden: Brill, 1968.
4. U.S. Agency for International Development, Economic
and Social Indicators -Turkey , 1969
,
Ankara: U.S.
Agency for International Development, 1969.
5. Simpson, D. J., "Development as a Process: The
Menderes Phase of Turkey," Middle East Journal
,
v. 9, p. 141-152, Spring 1961T
6. State Planning Organization, First Five-Year Develop -
ment Plan, 1963-1967
, Ankara: State Planning Or-
ganization, 1963.
7. State Planning Organization, Second Five-Year Develop -
ment Plan, 1968-1972
,
Ankara: State Planning Organ-
ization, 1969
.
8. State Planning Organization, Third Five-Year Develop -
ment Plan, 1975-1977
,
Ankara: State Planning Organ-
ization, 1973.
9. Tinbergen, J., "Methodological Background of the Plan
in Planning in Turkey," edited by S. Ilkin and E.
Inane, Ankara: Middle East Technical University,
1967.
10. Allen, R. G. D., Macro-Economic Theory: A Mathemati-
cal Treatment
,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1967.
11. Chenery, H. B., Studies in Development Planning
,
Harvard University Press, 1967.
12. Kuznets , S., Toward a Theory of Economic Growth , W.
W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968.
13. Mountjob, A. B., Industrialization and Underdeveloped
Countries
,
Aldine Publishing Company, 1968.
14. Bhagwati, J., The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries
,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.
121

15. Bruton, H. J., Principles of Development Economies
,
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965.
16. Kuznets, S., Economic Growth of Nations, Total Out -
put and Production Structure
,
The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1971.
17. Munro , John M. , "Migration in Turkey," Economic De -
velopment and Cultural Change
,
v. 21, p. 117-154,
February 1969.
18. Chenergy, H. B, Shishido, S., and Watanabe, T., "The
Pattern of Japanese Growth, 1914-1954," Econometrica
,
v. 30, p. 98-139, January 1962.
19. Griffin, K. B., and Enos , J. L., "Foreign Assistance:
Objectives and Consequencies , " Economic Development
and Cultural Change
,
v. 21, p. 313-327 , September
1970.
20. Bolch, Ben W. , and Huang Cliff, J., Multivariate Sta -
tistical Methods for Business and Economics , Prentice
Hall, 1974.
21. Frank, Charles R. , Jr., Statistics and Econometrics
,





1. Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 55




4. Asst Professor K. Terasawa, Code 55
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 3940
5. Dz.Kd.Bnb. Niyazi Gunal, Turkish Navy
Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanligi, Teknik D,
Bsk.ligi
Ankara, Turkey

























c.l - General qrowth and
basic problems of the
Turkish economy.
thesG8644
General growth and basic problems of the
3 2768 002 13588 1
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
